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- Mediating International Crises (Routledge Advances in International Relations and Global Politics)
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- Rethinking ethical foreign policy
- The United States and the Making of Modern Greece: History and Power, 1950-1974
http://spinnakerbaybrewing.com/?demisde=partnervermittlung-1010-wien&653=b6 Additional info for British Diplomacy and Swedish Politics, 1758–1773
كيف تكسب المال من خلال الإباحية Sample text
They were couched in urgent terms: this, he was told, was a chance England could not afford to miss. But they were notably lacking in precision, either as to the means to be employed, or the objectives to be aimed at; and the financial demands were large: van Marteville was asking for £20,000-£25,000. 82 Goodricke was coolly skeptical; and Holdernesse, who might have been prepared to take a ticket in this political lottery when it seemed that the price was only£ 2,000, 83 jibbed immediately when he learned the true amount.
F. Scheffer was fed by the information (undoubtedly derived from intercepted French dispatches) that France and Denmark would support Scheffer against him if it came to a struggle between them; and Goodricke was even authorized to say that England would be glad of a Swedish alliance-which was something no British minister had said for a generation. 95 But the bait was dangled in vain; for it was dangled too soon. Hopken was not yet ready to commit himself so far. Irritated though he might be with France, he dared not yet break the connection by an overt move for peace.
Goodricke very soon ran up against this complication. In November 1758 he was approached by a Court supporter who had fled from Sweden, and who suggested that England put up £2,000 to finance a lunatic scheme for kidnapping the members of the Senate. 81 To this, of course, he had nothing to say; but soon more official appeals were reaching him, by way of van Marteville, from Lovisa Ulrika; appeals for money to overthrow the Hats, to "throw off the yoke". They were couched in urgent terms: this, he was told, was a chance England could not afford to miss.