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13 In all, the first half of 1956 saw a German government which, though appearing more unified, continued to be divided over the nature of European integration. As before, Erhard’s free trade philosophy stood against the Foreign Ministry’s political preference for European integration binding Germany to the West, and to France in particular. Hence, the Auswärtiges Amt was more willing to compromise over the mounting French demands. Adenauer’s support for his Foreign Ministry was motivated, not by a preference for any particular form of economic integration, but by the will to see Western cohesion and prosperity strengthened in the face of mounting East–West tensions.

Most noteworthy was Erhard’s request for Butler’s assistance: The OEEC approach was infinitely to be preferred and would lead naturally to political integration when the time was right. 60 It seems, therefore, that the German Minister of Economics had called on the British government to do exactly what it did in November, when it sought to convince the German and the US governments to disassociate themselves from the Messina plans. However, if Erhard’s comments signalled his firm opposition to supranationalism, they did not envisage the abandonment of the customs union plan.

Officials had been aware not only of Adenauer’s enthusiasm for European integration as a means to strengthen Western cohesion but also of Erhard’s and Schäffer’s acceptance of a customs union as a means to achieve economic integration while continuing to strive for worldwide trade liberalization. On both counts, therefore, it is not surprising that the telegram had no effect on either of the two factions, with the From Indifference to Hostility: Britain, Germany and the Messina Project 33 exception of strengthening the conviction of the Auswärtiges Amt that Britain should indeed be left out of the negotiations so as to increase the chances of real integration.

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